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Abstract 
Unemployed people in Britain who are in receipt of government welfare benefits can 
have these benefits stopped if they fail to comply with certain conditions. Such a 
stoppage is known as a ‘benefit sanction’. The present working paper has two aims: i) 
to provide an introduction to British system of sanctions, specifically as it applies to 
unemployed people who are not disabled, and ii) to identify demographic inequalities 
in the application of sanctions. Using data published by the UK Department of Work 
and Pensions, we find that some groups of unemployed claimants (younger people, 
men, and ethnic minorities) are at substantially higher risk of experiencing a sanction. 
This working paper will be updated at a later date with analyses investigating the 
drivers of this inequality. 
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Introduction 
Most unemployed people of working age in the UK are entitled to receive public welfare 
support in the form of direct cash payments. The primary cash benefit programme for 
unemployed people who are not disabled is Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA),1 which can 
be claimed on the condition that the unemployed person is actively seeking work. 
Claimants can have their benefit payments temporarily stopped (a benefit ‘sanction’) 
if they are found to be in violation of the terms of JSA receipt: for example, if they fail 
to attend (or arrive late to) a meeting with their caseworker (Jobcentre personal 
adviser), or if they are judged not to be making enough effort to seek work.  
The system of benefit sanctions in the UK has generated a great deal of debate, both 
in the media, and among policymakers. A 2014 inquiry by the House of Commons 
Work and Pensions Committee into the sanctions regime attracted a large number of 
critical submissions. These included reports by ‘whistle-blowing’ Jobcentre staff about 
malpractice and poor treatment of claimants, as well as numerous submissions (by 
charitable organisations and by claimants themselves) describing the mental and 
physical health consequences of stopped payments.2 Beyond the inquiry, academic 
authors have also linked the sanctions regime with negative social outcomes, such as 
increased use of food banks (Loopstra et al., 2015a; 2016), and have questioned its 
effectiveness in improving employment outcomes. For example, Loopstra et al. 
(2015b) found that higher sanction rates led to a greater number of people ceasing to 
claim JSA, but did not increase employment rates. 
In this paper, we focus on the question of potential inequalities in the application of 
sanctions. Are some JSA claimants - for example claimants from particular ethnic 
groups – at greater risk of being sanctioned than others? Despite this question being 
included in the terms of reference of the 2014 House of Commons inquiry3 relatively 
little systematic research has been conducted. To our knowledge, only three statistical 
analyses of demographic inequalities in JSA sanction rates have been published. The 
first is an analysis by the New Policy Institute (2014) of data from 2013-14, which found 
that younger claimants were more likely to be sanctioned than older claimants and 
that men were more likely to be sanctioned than women. The second is contained in 
a report by the UK Welfare Conditionality Project (Watts et al., 2014). This analysis 
also found that 18-24 year old claimants were substantially more likely to be 
sanctioned than claimants from other age groups, and that this age-related inequality 
remained stable from 2000 to 2014. Finally, Reeves & Loopstra (2017) found that local 
                                                          
1
 From 2013, a proportion of claimants who would previously have been eligible for a specific type of 
JSA (based on income levels rather than previous tax contributions) have been transferred to the new 
Universal Credit (UC) programme. However, as of the end of 2016, the majority of claimants were 
enrolled on JSA rather than UC. 
2
 A full list of written submissions can be found at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/work-and-pensions-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/benefit-sanctions/?type=Written#pnlPublicationFilter 
3
 https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/work-and-
pensions-committee/news/benefit-sanctions-launch/ 
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authorities with higher proportions of ethnic minority claimants had slightly higher rates 
of JSA sanctions (though this association was not robust to adjustment for claimant 
characteristics, such as the length of claims).  
In the present paper, we use more recent data (through to the end of 2016) to take a 
more detailed look at demographic inequalities in the application of sanctions 
(including an analysis of the reasons why different groups are referred for sanction). 
The question of whether some groups of claimants are at greater risk of sanction than 
others is particularly important given the large degree discretion caseworkers are able 
to exercise in the application of sanctions.  
In order to claim JSA, eligible claimants must have an initial interview with a personal 
adviser4 at their local Jobcenter Plus office. During this interview, the claimant must 
sign a ‘Claimant Commitment’ outlining the steps they will take to find work. Claimants 
must then continue to attend regular interviews with their personal adviser over the 
course of their claim. Personal advisers have a dual role: 1) helping the claimant find 
work and, 2) assessing whether the claimant has violated the conditions of their 
benefit. In the latter case, the adviser is required to refer the claimant for a sanction. 
There are a number of violations for which personal advisers (and other Jobcentre 
staff) can refer a claimant for a sanction. These include “Failure to attend or participate 
in an adviser interview without good reason” (this includes late attendance), “Not 
actively seeking work” (inadequate attempts to find work), and “Left employment 
without good reason”. Appendix Table A1 provides a full list of reasons for referral. 
After a claimant has been referred for a sanction, an independent Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) ‘decision-maker’ (a different staff member within Jobcentre Plus) 
makes the determination as to whether the sanction should be applied. If they decide 
the sanction should proceed, the claimant’s benefit payments are stopped. At this 
point, the claimant may challenge the decision and present new evidence or 
arguments as to why they should not be sanctioned. The decision-maker will either 
accept these arguments and reverse the sanction, or reject them and keep it in place. 
If a claimant persists in challenging the decision after this point a (non-local) ‘dispute 
resolution team’ will reconsider the case and come to a final decision as to whether 
the sanction should be upheld or overturned. After this process is complete, if the 
claimant is still not satisfied with the outcome, they may appeal to an independent 
Social Security and Child Support Tribunal.5 If at any point in the process the sanction 
decision is overturned, the claimant is entitled to have missed payments refunded.  
It should be noted that it is not only Jobcentre staff who can refer claimants for 
sanction. Between June 2011 and April 2017, the UK government operated a ‘back-
to-work’ scheme called the Work Programme. This scheme targeted claimants who 
had been on JSA for a year (less for younger claimants). Claimants mandated to 
participate in the Work Programme were assigned to external (public, private, or third 
                                                          
4
 In some cases, Jobcentre personal advisers are instead referred to as ‘Work Coaches’. 
5
 https://www.gov.uk/social-security-child-support-tribunal/before-you-appeal 
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sector) organisations tasked with helping them prepare for and find work. Staff at these 
organisations were required to refer claimants for sanction if they were not fully 
complying with the programme. For example, claimants assigned to a Work 
Programme provider could be sanctioned if they did not “take part fully” in an activity 
mandated by the provider, such as a training session or work experience placement.6  
Jobcentre personal advisers, Work Programme providers, and DWP decision-makers7 
are given detailed guidance as to when a claimant should be referred for sanction and 
when a sanction should be applied (see footnote 4). Nevertheless, there remains 
considerable scope for individual discretion at each stage of the process. For example, 
a Jobcentre personal adviser may decide to be more or less lenient in referring a 
claimant for arriving late to an adviser Interview; or a decision-maker may be more or 
less strict in determining what constitutes acceptable evidence that a claimant had a 
‘good reason’ for being late. 
We are not aware of any academic research into welfare caseworker discretion in the 
UK. However, research on the US system has found that caseworker treatment of 
claimants is often highly variable. For example, allowances may be made for some 
clients who fail to meet a particular requirement, but not others (Brodkin, 1997; 
Meyers, Glaser, & MacDonald, 1998; Hagen & Ownes-Manley, 2002). Rules may be 
adhered to strictly in order to punish disfavoured claimants, or interpreted liberally to 
avoid causing harm to favoured clients.   
Though detailed academic research is absent, there is nevertheless considerable 
evidence to support the idea that staff administering JSA in the UK exercise a high 
degree of discretion in the application of sanction rules, and that this results in the 
inconsistent treatment of claimants. A number of submissions to the 2014 House of 
Commons inquiry detail the various ways in which claimants may be treated more or 
less harshly by caseworkers. For example, in one submission, a Jobcentre personal 
adviser describes the pressure felt by staff at his Jobcentre to increase the number of 
claimants they referred for sanction, independent of claimant compliance (Longden, 
2014). Longden notes that selected claimants were subjected to an “almost forensic” 
scrutiny of their job search activity in order to locate a reason to refer the claimant for 
sanction. A submission by the Public and Commercial Services Union (2014)8 
provides evidence (in the form of emails from managers) of similar pressure on both 
Jobcentre personal advisers and decision-makers to increase their individual referral 
and sanction rates. 
Further evidence of the scope of individual discretion in the application of sanctions 
comes from analyses of variation in referral and sanction rates. Analyses by both 
                                                          
6
 Guidance for Work Programme providers on raising ‘compliance doubts’ is provided here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/624475/work-
programme-provider-guidance-chapter-6.pdf 
7
 Throughout the rest of this paper, ‘caseworker’ is used as a generic term covering any staff member 
able to make decisions about whether to refer, apply, or uphold a sanction against a claimant. 
8
 The trade union covering UK public sector workers, including Jobcentre Plus staff  
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Webster (2014) and the National Audit Office (NAO; 2016) found large amounts of 
unexplained variation between Jobcentres in the proportion of claimants referred for 
sanction, with the NAO explicitly noting that this may be due to differences in the 
behaviour of personal advisers. The NAO analysis also found large unexplained 
differences in referral rates between Work Programme providers. Within regions, 
claimants were randomly assigned to a Work Programme provider – meaning that 
there should be no systematic differences in the composition of claimants assigned to 
each provider (NAO, 2016). Nevertheless, some providers referred much higher 
proportions of claimants for sanction than did others.9 This level of variation between 
Jobcentres and Work Programme providers suggests that similar claimants are 
receiving very different treatment when it comes to the application of sanctions. 
One of the consequences of the discretion exercised by caseworkers (whether DWP 
staff or external providers) is that it increases the potential influence of individual 
biases and stereotypes – for example, based on ethnicity, gender, or age. In the US, 
Monat (2010) suggests that racial bias is one of the explanations for why Black and 
Latino claimants are more likely to receive a welfare sanction than are White 
claimants. Focusing on female claimants, she suggests that “Black and Latina 
participants may experience an increased risk of sanctions due to racialized 
stereotypes or ideologies held by caseworkers”. Examples of such stereotypes include 
that claimants from these ethnic groups are “irresponsible” or have a “poor work ethic” 
(Monat, 2010, p.51). Similar ethnic attitudes and stereotypes (as well as those relating 
to age and gender) may also affect decisions made by welfare caseworkers in the UK, 
thereby potentially contributing to demographic inequalities in sanction rates. 
The present working paper attempts to answer the following questions: 
1. Which demographic groups are most likely to be referred for a JSA sanction? 
2. Do demographic inequalities in referrals persist in final sanction decisions? 
3. Are different demographic groups referred for sanction for different reasons? 
4. Have demographic inequalities in referrals increased or decreased over time? 
These analyses are not able to address the question of why demographic inequalities 
exist. Crucially they cannot determine whether inequalities result from structural 
factors, differences in claimant behaviour or differential treatment of claimants by 
caseworkers. We intend to expand this working paper in the future to include analyses 
focused on addressing this question. 
                                                          
9
 For example, in the West Midlands, Serco (a private provider) referred claimants at twice the rate of 
Interserve (another private provider).  
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Methods 
Data 
Monthly data on the number of JSA claimants referred and sanctioned by age group, 
ethnicity, and gender were retrieved from the DWP Stat-Xplore website10 for the period 
November 201211 to December 2016. 
Monthly data on the total number of people claiming JSA in each month over the same 
period (the claimant count) were retrieved from Nomis, the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) portal which hosts official UK labour market statistics.12 
Analyses 
The results below include two types of figures: 
1. Referral rates. These are expressed as the percentage of JSA claimants 
referred for sanction per month (the total number of JSA claimants referred for 
sanction in a given month divided by the total number of people claiming JSA 
that month). 
2. Sanction rates. These are expressed as the percentage of JSA claimants 
sanctioned per month (the total number of JSA claimants sanctioned divided by 
the total number of people claiming JSA). 
There are two important points to note about these figures. First, the sanction counts 
published by the DWP on StatXplore only include sanctions applied after claimant 
challenges have been resolved. They do not include individuals who were sanctioned 
but later had this sanction overturned after a successful challenge. Because claimants 
whose sanction is overturned still have their benefit payments stopped (this money is 
only refunded later, often after a substantial delay), the sanction rate figures given 
below are an underestimate of the true number of claimants who experience the 
negative consequences of a benefit stoppage. Around 25% of JSA claimants 
challenge their sanction decision, and of these challenges, 75% are successful 
(Webster, 2016a), so this distinction is significant.  
The second point to note is that both the sanction and referral rate figures represent 
the proportion of JSA claimants sanctioned or referred per month. As Webster (2016b) 
notes, they do not reflect (as has been suggested by a number of policymakers) the 
total proportion of JSA claimants who have ever received a sanction, or who have 
received a sanction in a given year. For example, in 2014, an average of 5% of 
claimants were sanctioned per month. However, 24% of people who claimed JSA in 
2014 as a whole received a sanction that year (Webster 2016b). The latter figures are 
not published by the DWP and are therefore not included in this analysis. 
                                                          
10
 https://stat-xplore.dwp.gov.uk/webapi/jsf/login.xhtml 
11
 In October 2012, rules on the application of sanctions were changed. Therefore all figures from 
November 2012 onwards are derived from consistent sanction rules.   
12
 https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/ 
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The analyses below also examine the proportion of referrals made for different 
reasons. These reasons are grouped into six categories for the purposes of analysis: 
1. Failure to participate in the Work Programme. This category covers referrals 
made by external providers when claimants are judged not to be participating 
fully in the Work Programme. 
2. Work focused interviews. This category covers referrals made by Jobcentre 
personal advisers for reasons relating to their meetings with claimants. This 
includes failure to attend (or late attendance at) adviser interviews without good 
reason and failure to comply with a Jobseeker’s Direction without good 
reason.13 
3. Availability for work. This category covers a number of reasons relating to the 
claimant not taking sufficient steps to seek work, or to apply for relevant jobs. It 
also covers claimants failing to accept job offers or not being available for work. 
4. Other employment programmes. The DWP runs a number of employment 
programmes (for example training schemes) which do not fall under the banner 
of the Work Programme. Failure to participate fully in these schemes is also a 
reason for sanction referral. 
5. Leaving previous employment. Claimants may be referred for sanction if they 
leave a job voluntarily without good reason, or if they lose a job due to 
misconduct. 
6. Other reasons. Other referral reasons not covered under the previous 
categories, including trade disputes and joint claims exemptions14 
Table A1 in the appendix gives the detailed breakdown of reasons in each category. 
Results 
Demographic composition of JSA claimants 
In the median month over the period November 2012 to December 2016 there were 
806,070 people claiming JSA in Great Britain.15 Table 1, below, gives the demographic 
composition of claimants in the median month. 
 
 
                                                          
13
 A Jobseeker’s Direction is a course of action a personal adviser mandates a claimant to take to 
help them get work. For example, a claimant may be considered to be compromising their ability to 
get work by having an out of date CV. A Jobseeker’s Direction may therefore be issued requiring the 
claimant to update their CV. If the claimant fails to comply they can be referred for sanction. 
14
 Joint claims are when two members of a couple make a single joint JSA claim  
15
 These statistics do not include Northern Ireland 
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Table 1. Demographic composition of JSA 
claimants in the median month between 
November 2012 and December 2016 
Male gender 63.7% 
Age group  
Under 18 0.1 
18-24 22.9 
25-49 56.7 
50 20.6 
Ethnicity  
White 76.0 
Mixed 2.1 
Asian or Asian British 6.0 
Black or Black British 7.5 
Chinese or other ethnic group 2.6 
Prefer not to say 4.2 
Unknown 1.4 
 
Total referrals and sanctions 
Over the period November 2012 to December 2016, an average (median) of 7.0% of 
JSA claimants per month were referred for sanction. Around half this figure (3.6%) 
actually received a sanction. 
Table 2 gives the proportion of referrals in each reason category. This shows that the 
most common reason for a referral was failure to participate in the Work Programme. 
40% of all claimants referred were referred for sanction by external Work Programme 
providers. The next most common reasons for referral were work focused interviews 
(the most common specific reason within this category was failure to attend an adviser 
interview, representing 87% of all referrals in this category), and availability for work 
(the most common specific reason within this category was ‘not actively seeking 
employment’, representing 67% of referrals). 
 
Table 2. Breakdown of referrals by referral reason 
(median month between November 2012 and December 
2016) 
Work programme 39.0% 
Work focused interviews 21.1% 
Availability for work 21.5% 
Other employment programmes 7.6% 
Leaving previous employment 11.1% 
Other referral reason 0.6% 
 
The dominance of the Work Programme is likely due to two factors. First, claimants 
participating in the Work Programme do not have regular contact with their Jobcentre 
personal advisers, and are therefore much less likely to be referred for other reasons 
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(such as failing to attend an adviser interview). Second, unlike, Jobcentre personal 
advisers, who are permitted to evaluate whether a claimant had a ‘good reason’ for 
(for example) failing to attend an adviser interview, Work Programme providers are 
explicitly instructed not to consider whether or not a claimant had a good reason for in 
some way failing to participate fully in the work programme. This is spelled out in the 
guidelines for Work Programme providers: “…you have no option but to raise a doubt16 
once the participant has failed to carry out a mandated activity, irrespective of whether 
or not they have offered an explanation afterwards” (p.6 of the guidance for Work 
Programme providers – see footnote 4). It is then up to the DWP decision-maker to 
determine whether or not the claimant had a good reason, and therefore whether the 
sanction should be applied.17  
Are some groups of claimants more likely than others to be referred for 
sanction? 
Figure 1 breaks down referral rates by age, gender, and ethnic group. The largest 
differences are between age groups. Overall, an average 10.8% of claimants between 
18 and 24 are referred for sanction per month, compared to 6.5% of claimants between 
25 and 49, and 4.0% of claimants 50 and over. 
This age difference exists within all ethnic groups and for both men and women. For 
example, among 18-24 year old men, 11.7% of White, 13.8% of Black, and 12.2% of 
Asian claimants were referred for sanction per month. The corresponding figures for 
men aged 25-49 were 6.9%, 7.6% and 7.5%. Age differences for women were of a 
similar magnitude (the precise numbers behind Figure 2 are given in Table A2 in the 
appendix). The difference between the 18-24 and 25-49 groups was larger than the 
difference between the latter group and those who were 50+. 
                                                          
16
 I.e. refer the claimant for a sanction 
17
 As noted above, despite these seemingly strict guidelines, there remain large differences in referral 
rates between Work Programme providers serving the same client base  
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Figure 1. Median percentage of claimants referred per month by age, gender, and ethnicity (Nov 
2012-Dec 2016)  
Figure 1 also shows that men are more likely to be referred than women. Overall, an 
average of 7.5% of male claimants were referred for sanction per month, compared to 
6.1% of female claimants.  
This gender difference exists within almost all age and ethnic groups. For example, 
within the 18-24 year old age group, 11.7% of White men were referred for sanction 
compared to 9.1% of White women, 13.8% of Black men were referred compared to 
10.2% of Black women, and 12.2% of Asian men were referred compared to 9.2% of 
Asian women. There are differences of a similar magnitude within the 25-49 year old 
age group. However, the differences are smaller (and in some cases non-existent) 
within the 50+ age group. For example, in this age group 3.9% of White male claimants 
were referred for sanction, compared to 3.7% of White female claimants. 
Ethnic inequalities are generally smaller than those according to age and gender. 
However, consistent patterns emerge. In almost all age and gender combinations 
White claimants are the least likely to be referred for sanction. For example, as noted 
above, among 18-24 year old men (where ethnic differences are largest), 11.7% of 
White claimants were referred for sanction per month compared to 13.8% of Black, 
14.0% of Mixed, and 12.2% of Asian claimants. Across almost all ages and genders, 
claimants of Black and Mixed ethnicity are the most likely to be referred for sanction. 
The exception to this pattern is 25-49 year old female claimants. Within this group 
White claimants have the highest referral rates and Asian claimants the lowest. 
However, the differences between these groups are very small (5.7% vs. 5.3%, 
respectively). Overall, an average of 6.9% of White claimants were referred for 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Men Women Men Women Men Women
18-24 25-49 50+
R
ef
er
ra
l r
at
e 
(%
)
Asian or Asian British Black or Black British Chinese or other ethnic group Mixed White
III Working paper 15                       Robert de Vries, Aaron Reeves & Ben Geiger 
 
13 
 
sanction per month, compared to 8.0% of Mixed, 7.3% of Asian, and 7.2% of Black 
claimants. 
Do demographic inequalities in referrals persist in rates of actual sanctions? 
Figure 2 gives the rate of final (post-challenge) sanctions by demographic group 
(underlying figures given in Table A3). These figures show that the demographic 
inequalities observed at the referral stage persist in the final sanction rate. Younger 
claimants are more likely to be sanctioned than older claimants; men are more likely 
to be sanctioned than women; White claimants are (in most age/gender combinations) 
least likely to be sanctioned, and Black and Mixed claimants are most likely.  
 
Figure 2. Median percentage of claimants sanctioned per month by age, gender, and ethnicity 
(Nov 2012-Dec 2016) 
Rather than being equalised by the post-referral decision making process, 
demographic inequalities are in fact amplified. For example: 
 White men aged 18-24 are 70% more likely to be referred for sanction than 
White men aged 25-49. The relative difference in the rate of actual sanctions 
is 98% 
 Black men aged 18-24 are 36% more likely to be referred for sanction than 
Black women in the same age group. The relative difference in the sanction 
rate is 46%. 
 Black men aged 18-24 are 18% more likely to be referred for sanction than 
White men in the same age group. The relative difference in the final sanction 
rate is 23%. 
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In some cases, the decision making process also introduces inequalities which were 
not present at the referral stage. For example, White women aged 25-49 are slightly 
more likely to be referred for sanction than Asian women of the same age. However, 
after the decision making process, Asian women in this age group are actually 16% 
more likely to be sanctioned than White women. 
This amplifying effect of the decision-making process can be seen more clearly in 
Figure 3 (underlying figures given in Table A4), which shows, for each demographic 
group, sanctions as a percentage of referrals. Figure 3 shows that, if referred, 
claimants aged 18-24 are more likely to actually receive a sanction than older age 
groups. Similarly, within age and ethnic groups, men are more likely to be sanctioned 
if referred. In terms of ethnicity, in all cases White claimants are the least likely to be 
sanctioned if referred. Asian claimants and those in the ‘Chinese or other’ group are, 
in many cases, the most likely to be sanctioned if referred. This may be due to the fact 
that members of these groups are less likely to speak English as a native language 
and may therefore have greater difficulty providing ‘good’ reasons for breaches when 
questioned by decision makers, or in mounting a successful challenge to an adverse 
sanction decision (Reeves & Loopstra, 2017). This interpretation is supported by the 
fact that the relative disadvantage of Asian and ‘Chinese or other’ claimants is largest 
among the oldest claimants, and among women.  
 
Figure 3. Median number of sanctions as a percentage of referrals by age, gender, and 
ethnicity (Nov 2012-Dec 2016) 
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Are different demographic groups referred for different reasons? 
Figures 4 and 5 gives the proportion of referrals made for each reason for each 
demographic group (Figure 4 shows results for women and Figure 5 for men; 
underlying figures are given in Tables A5 and A6). 18 These figures show that the 
pattern of referrals is relatively similar across demographic groups. However, there 
are some notable differences. 
First, there are clear age differences in the proportion of referrals made relating to the 
adviser interview, availability for work, and employment programmes outside the Work 
Programme. Younger claimants are more likely to be referred for sanction due to 
failure to attend (which may include being late for) an adviser interview or for failing to 
comply with a Jobseeker’s Direction. Younger claimants are also more likely to be 
referred for failure to engage with an employment programme. By contrast, claimants 
aged 50+ are more likely than those in other age groups to be referred due to problems 
with being available for work. 
There are also some notable differences between ethnic groups. Among both men 
and women: 
 White and ‘Chinese or other’ claimants are less likely than claimants from other 
ethnic groups to be referred for reasons relating to the adviser interview 
 Asian and ‘Chinese or other’ claimants are more likely than other claimants to 
be referred for problems with availability for work 
 White claimants are substantially more likely than claimants of other ethnicities 
to be referred for reasons relating to leaving employment (leaving employment 
without good reason, or being fired due to misconduct). 
Comparing Figures 4 and 5 also shows that male claimants are generally more likely 
than female claimants to be referred for reasons relating to the adviser interview and 
for failing to engage with an employment programme. Female claimants are more 
likely than male claimants to be referred for reasons relating to leaving a job. 
                                                          
18
 Some totals sum to more than 100% because individual claimants may be referred more than once 
per month. Some totals sum to less than 100% due to disclosure control: low numbers for some 
demographic groups within specific referral reasons are suppressed, leading to fewer people being 
recorded in each reason category than the actual total number of referrals made. For example, there 
are small numbers of referrals for ‘Chinese or other’ and Mixed ethnicity claimants in the 50+ age 
group. 
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Figure 4. Percentage of referrals made for each referral reason, by age and ethnicity (median 
month, Nov 2012-Dec 2016) – female claimants 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of referrals made for each referral reason, by age and ethnicity (median 
month, Nov 2012-Dec 2016) – male claimants 
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Have demographic inequalities changed over time? 
Figure 6 shows the trend over time in referral rates and sanction rates. Monthly 
sanction and referral rates peaked in late 2013, followed by a sharp decline into early 
2014. This was followed by a consistent steady decline. 
 
Figure 6. Monthly sanction and referral rate, Nov 2012 – Dec 2016 
 
Figure 7. Monthly referral rate by age and ethnicity, Nov 2012 – Dec 2016 (female claimants) 
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Figure 8. Monthly referral rate by age and ethnicity, Nov 2012 – Dec 2016 (female claimants) 
Figures 7 and 8 show trends in referral rates by age and ethnic group for women and 
men, respectively. For ease of interpretation, only the three largest ethnic groups are 
plotted. These graphs show that referral rates have followed a generally similar pattern 
for all demographic groups. However, while age and gender inequalities have 
remained relatively consistent over the period, differences between ethnic groups 
have narrowed considerably (though, among men, White claimants remain less likely 
to be referred for sanction than Black or Asian claimants). 
Discussion 
The negative effects of receiving a benefit sanction on mental and physical health 
have been well documented. The figures given above show that there are substantial 
demographic inequalities in the risk of receiving a JSA sanction. Some groups of JSA 
claimants are substantially more likely than others to be referred for a sanction and to 
have their benefits stopped. The most pronounced differences are those between 
different age groups. Over the period November 2012 – December 2016, 18-24 year 
old claimants were substantially more likely to be referred for, and to receive a sanction 
than were older claimants. For both men and women, and across most ethnic groups, 
the former were almost twice as likely to be sanctioned as the latter. 
The statistics also highlight substantial gender differences. At all ages, and for almost 
all ethnic groups, men are considerably more likely to be sanctioned than women. 
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Ethnic inequalities were generally smaller than those according to age and gender. 
However, there were consistent patterns. Independent of age and gender, White 
claimants were less likely to be referred for a sanction, and less likely to ultimately 
receive a sanction, than were claimants from other ethnic groups. Black claimants and 
claimants of Mixed ethnicity were generally more likely than claimants from other 
groups to be referred and sanctioned. These ethnic differences were largest for the 
group most at risk of sanctions overall: 18-24 year old men. Ethnic differences appear 
to have narrowed over time, but inequalities persist, particularly among young men. 
Why are these groups more likely to be sanctioned than others? Potential explanations 
fall into two broad camps. The first concerns claimant characteristics and behaviour: 
claimants in some demographic categories may be genuinely more or less compliant 
with JSA conditions. This may be due to claimant attitudes towards and engagement 
with the welfare system. For example, younger claimants may be less reliant on JSA 
payments (for example, if they receive parental help) and may therefore be less 
concerned about complying in order to avoid sanctions. Socio-demographic 
characteristics not captured in the sanctions data, such as English language ability or 
caring responsibilities, may also make compliance more difficult for some groups, 
regardless of their motivation to find a job or to avoid sanctions. As Monat (2010) notes 
in her discussion of the US welfare system, some groups may also suffer 
discrimination at the hands of employers, which may have knock-on effects on their 
ability to comply with welfare requirements. For example, experimental research in the 
UK has shown that employers are often less willing to hire ethnic minority candidates 
(Wood et al., 2009). Even absent direct discrimination, it is also possible that claimants 
from certain groups are more likely to live in areas with poorer labour market 
conditions, which may reduce apparent compliance with the welfare system.  
The second category of explanation concerns the treatment of claimants by 
caseworkers. As noted above, caseworkers enjoy considerable individual discretion 
(either formal or informal) in the application of sanctions. It is therefore plausible that 
Jobcentre personal advisers, Work Programme providers, and DWP decision-makers 
treat members of some demographic groups more harshly than others. For example, 
older claimants may be treated more leniently due to a perception that they have more 
difficulty finding work and that they have ‘paid more into the system’ over the years. 
Male, and Black and minority ethnic (BME) claimants may also be treated differently 
due to gender and ethnic stereotypes. An experimental vignette study by Schram et 
al. (2009) in the US demonstrates how this process might operate. Schram et al. 
(2009) surveyed around 100 welfare caseworkers with sanctioning authority, using 
vignettes to present the cases of hypothetical claimants. They found that caseworkers 
were more likely to sanction a hypothetical Black claimant with a ‘discrediting marker’ 
(for example a prior sanction for non-compliance) than an identical White claimant. By 
contrast, a similar study in Norway found evidence of more lenient treatment of North 
African as opposed to Norwegian welfare claimants (Terum et al., 2017). As far as we 
are aware, there have been no studies which have directly examined discrimination 
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by welfare caseworkers in the UK (from the perspective of either caseworkers or 
claimants).  
Again, the geographic distribution of claimants from different demographic groups may 
also play a role, absent direct discrimination. As we have noted, some groups may be 
more likely to live in areas with poorer labour market prospects. It is possible that 
caseworkers may treat claimants in these areas more or less leniently in terms of the 
application of sanctions.  
The results presented above cannot distinguish between the potential explanations 
offered above. However, we intend to expand this working paper to include analyses 
to address this question. 
  
III Working paper 15                       Robert de Vries, Aaron Reeves & Ben Geiger 
 
21 
 
Reference list 
Brodkin, E.Z., 1997. Inside the welfare contract: Discretion and accountability in state 
welfare administration. Social Service Review, 71(1), pp.1-33.  
Hagen, J.L. and Owens-Manley, J., 2002. Issues in implementing TANF in New 
York: The perspective of frontline workers. Social Work, 47(2), pp.171-182.  
Longden, J. 2014. Written evidence submitted to the 2014 Work and Pensions 
Select Committee Inquiry on Benefit sanctions [available at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/
work-and-pensions-committee/benefit-sanctions-policy-beyond-the-oakley-
review/written/16165.html] 
Loopstra, R., Fledderjohann, J., Reeves, A. and Stuckler, D., 2016. The impact of 
benefit sanctioning on food insecurity: a dynamic cross-area study of food bank 
usage in the UK. University of Oxford Sociology Working Papers, 2016-03. 
Loopstra, R., Reeves, A., McKee, M. and Stuckler, D., 2015. Do punitive approaches 
to unemployment benefit recipients increase welfare exit and employment? A cross-
area analysis of UK sanctioning reforms. University of Oxford Sociology Working 
Papers, 2015-01. 
Loopstra, R., Reeves, A., Taylor-Robinson, D., Barr, B., McKee, M. and Stuckler, D., 
2015a. Austerity, sanctions, and the rise of food banks in the UK. BMJ (Clinical 
research ed), 350, p.h1775. 
Meyers, M.K., Glaser, B. and Donald, K.M., 1998. On the front lines of welfare 
delivery: Are workers implementing policy reforms?. Journal of policy analysis and 
management, pp.1-22.  
Monnat, S.M., 2010. The color of welfare sanctioning: Exploring the individual and 
contextual roles of race on TANF case closures and benefit reductions. The 
Sociological Quarterly, 51(4), pp.678-707. 
National Audit Office. 2016. Benefit Sanctions: Report by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General [available at: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Benefit-sanctions.pdf] 
New Policy Institute. 2014. Written evidence submitted to the 2014 Work and 
Pensions Select Committee Inquiry on Benefit sanctions (SAN0156) [available at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/
work-and-pensions-committee/benefit-sanctions-policy-beyond-the-oakley-
review/written/17368.html] 
Pager, D., Bonikowski, B. and Western, B., 2009. Discrimination in a low-wage labor 
market: A field experiment. American Sociological Review, 74(5), pp.777-799. 
Public and Commercial Services Union. 2014. Supplementary written evidence 
submitted to the 2014 Work and Pensions Select Committee Inquiry on Benefit 
III Working paper 15                       Robert de Vries, Aaron Reeves & Ben Geiger 
 
22 
 
sanctions (SAN0161) [available at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/PCS%20(SAN0161)%20300115.pdf] 
Reeves, A., & Loopstra, R. (2017). ‘Set up to Fail’? How Welfare Conditionality 
Undermines Citizenship for Vulnerable Groups. Social Policy and Society, 16(2), 
327-338. 
Schram, S.F., Soss, J., Fording, R.C. and Houser, L., 2009. Deciding to discipline: 
Race, choice, and punishment at the frontlines of welfare reform. American 
Sociological Review, 74(3), pp.398-422. 
Terum, L.I., Torsvik, G. And Øverbye, E., 2017. Discrimination Against Ethnic 
Minorities in Activation Programme? Evidence from a Vignette Experiment. Journal 
of Social Policy, pp.1-18. 
Watts, B., Fitzpatrick, S., Bramley, G., and Watkins, D. 2014. Welfare sanctions and 
conditionality in the UK. Joseph Rowntree Foundation Report [available at: 
https://www.jrf.org.uk/file/45777/download?token=8EeV7KdU&filetype=full-report] 
Webster, D. 2016a. Briefing: The DWP’s JSA/ESA Sanctions Statistics Release, 17 
August 2016 [available at: http://www.cpag.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/16-
08%20Sanctions%20Stats%20Briefing%20-%20D%20Webster.docx] 
Webster, D. 2016b. Tackling Britain’s misleading benefit sanctions statistics. 
welfareconditionality.ac.uk [available at: 
http://www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk/2016/04/tackling-britains-misleading-benefit-
sanctions-statistics/] 
Wood, M., Hales, J., Purdon, S., Sejersen, T., & Hayllar, O. 2009. A test for racial 
discrimination in recruitment in practice in British cities. Department for Work and 
Pensions Research Report No 607 [available at: 
http://www.natcen.ac.uk/media/20541/test-for-racial-discrimination.pdf] 
  
III Working paper 15                       Robert de Vries, Aaron Reeves & Ben Geiger 
 
23 
 
Appendix 
Table A1. Referral reasons 
1. Failure to participate in a scheme for assisting person to obtain employment without 
good reason - Work Programme 
2. Work focused interviews 
Failure to attend or participate in an adviser interview without good reason 
Refusal or failure to comply with a Jobseeker's Direction without good reason 
3. Availability for work 
Not actively seeking employment 
Not being available for work 
Neglect to avail themselves of a reasonable opportunity of employment without good reason 
Refusal or failure to apply for, or accept if offered, a job which an employment officer has informed 
him/her is vacant or about to become vacant without good reason 
Jobseeker's Agreement questions 
4. Other employment programmes 
Voluntarily leaves a place on a training scheme or employment programme without good reason 
Losing through misconduct a place on a training scheme or employment programme 
Refusal of a place on a training scheme or employment programme without good reason 
Neglect to avail themselves of a reasonable opportunity of a place on an a training or employment 
scheme without good reason 
Failure to attend a training or employment scheme without good reason 
Failure to participate in a scheme for assisting person to obtain employment without good reason - 
Skills Conditionality 
Failure to participate in a scheme for assisting person to obtain employment without good reason - 
other scheme 
Failure to participate in a scheme for assisting person to obtain employment without good reason - 
Work Experience 
Failure to participate in Mandatory Work Activity without good reason 
Failure to participate in supervised job search 
5. Leaving previous employment 
Left employment voluntarily without good reason 
Losing employment through misconduct 
6. Other reasons 
Trade disputes 
Joint claim exemption 
Other referral reason 
 
 Table A2. Data for Figure 1 
 18-24 25-49 50+ 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Asian or Asian British 12.21 9.18 7.53 5.33 4.53 4.23 
Black or Black British 13.79 10.15 7.59 5.59 5.1 3.98 
Chinese or other 
ethnic group 12.71 9.22 6.94 5.44 4.6 4.64 
Mixed 14.03 10.39 7.75 5.52 4.74 3.91 
White 11.7 9.08 6.86 5.65 3.93 3.68 
 
  
III Working paper 15                       Robert de Vries, Aaron Reeves & Ben Geiger 
 
24 
 
Table A3. Data for Figure 2 
 18-24 25-49 50+ 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Asian or Asian British 8.64 5.84 4.68 3.21 3.14 2.86 
Black or Black British 9.42 6.43 4.77 3.06 3.15 2.16 
Chinese or other 
ethnic group 
8.40 5.93 4.52 3.19 3.09 2.76 
Mixed 9.20 6.18 4.91 3.11 2.82 2.06 
White 7.63 5.31 3.85 2.77 2.21 1.83 
 
Table A4. Data for Figure 3 
 18-24 25-49 50+ 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Asian or Asian British 59.72 55.81 53.25 51.14 54.29 52.79 
Black or Black British 60.25 57.14 53.27 47.38 51.64 44.62 
Chinese or other 
ethnic group 
61.28 55.93 54.50 51.15 55.16 52.50 
Mixed 56.97 53.37 50.64 45.90 52.12 46.03 
White 57.28 51.24 50.22 44.49 48.94 42.45 
 
Table A5. Data for Figure 4 
  Work 
Programme 
Work 
focused 
interview 
Availability 
for work 
Other jobs 
programme 
Leaving 
previous job 
Other 
referral 
reason 
18-24 
Asian 33.63 25.79 25.03 9.17 8.77 0.00 
Black 36.90 29.34 21.40 8.07 7.91 0.00 
Chinese 
or other 34.96 23.56 30.31 8.97 8.19 0.00 
Mixed 39.50 27.57 16.77 7.02 10.82 0.00 
White 39.26 22.80 19.13 6.59 14.09 0.57 
25-49 
  
Asian 35.25 19.93 25.59 7.25 9.72 0.00 
Black 44.48 21.09 18.53 6.32 7.69 0.00 
Chinese 
or other 37.23 17.82 26.06 7.03 9.96 0.00 
Mixed 44.95 21.08 19.28 5.79 10.67 0.00 
White 41.90 17.76 16.86 5.56 16.60 0.64 
50+ 
Asian 36.38 14.19 35.55 6.63 3.91 0.00 
Black 46.02 15.82 21.06 5.91 7.31 0.00 
Chinese 
or other 37.87 11.93 33.33 5.56 0.00 0.00 
Mixed 38.74 0.00 14.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 
White 33.28 13.24 21.89 5.64 22.74 0.63 
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Table A6. Data for Figure 5 
  Work 
Programme 
Work 
focused 
interview 
Availability 
for work 
Other jobs 
programme 
Leaving 
previous 
job 
Other 
referral 
reason 
18-24 
Asian 33.37 30.20 25.09 11.04 5.24 0.43 
Black 42.76 30.06 20.09 8.95 3.32 0.00 
Chinese 
or other 35.56 25.12 27.90 10.60 4.32 0.00 
Mixed 42.09 29.61 18.87 9.17 4.99 0.00 
White 40.49 24.94 21.89 7.65 7.55 0.55 
25-49 
  
Asian 34.99 22.05 24.28 9.36 7.97 0.09 
Black 42.99 22.98 18.39 8.14 4.98 0.37 
Chinese 
or other 34.82 19.73 26.68 9.54 6.74 0.00 
Mixed 41.81 22.66 18.94 8.04 6.58 0.00 
White 39.62 20.98 20.49 7.94 11.74 0.61 
50+ 
Asian 33.16 15.02 36.41 8.21 5.54 0.00 
Black 39.16 19.25 23.96 9.21 3.84 0.00 
Chinese 
or other 35.73 13.97 33.61 7.51 3.24 0.00 
Mixed 36.87 16.38 29.12 5.27 0.00 0.00 
White 32.61 15.48 28.03 7.82 13.59 0.63 
 
